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Much of the confusion and diversity has resulted because these other
courts do not separate their analyses of subject matter and personal juris-
diction questions. Since Texas Trading does analyze these questions sep-
arately, uniform minimum contacts standards can be applied in all cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
After an exhaustive analysis of jurisdiction under the commercial ac-
tivity exception to the Immunities Act, the Texas Trading court devel-
oped a unique five-part test. This test separates the subject matter, per-
sonal jurisdiction, statutory, and constitutional questions, while providing
standards for each part of the test. The Texas Trading test should pro-
vide needed uniformity in a substantial number of decisions involving the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states. Thus, Texas Trading's elabo-
ration of specific guidelines will give needed definition to the minimum
contacts standard in the context of the Immunities Act.
The court noted throughout the opinion that access to the courts is
the determinative factor in a decision to exercise jurisdiction. This liberal
attitude has been embraced by a New York federal district court in In re
Rio Grande Transport.5 The Rio Grande Transport court repeatedly
emphasized the concern of Congress that those aggrieved by the commer-
cial acts of a foreign sovereign should be given a forum. Thus, the Texas
Trading five-part test seems destined to lead to a uniform but broad ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns by the New York federal
courts.
Wannell Baird
EMS Currency Rates Realigned
The European Monetary System (EMS) is the European Commu-
nity's mechanism for linking the currencies of West Germany, France, It-
aly, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in a
joint float against the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.' By promot-
ing stable exchange rates, the EMS seeks to integrate and harmonize the
75. In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
1. For an in-depth discussion of the European Monetary System, see Development, The
European Monetary System and the European Currency Unit, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'v




economies of member states.
On October 4, 1981, the values of the West German mark and the
Dutch guilder were boosted by 5.5% against their European partners, and
the value of the French franc and the Italian lira were cut by 3%. Aside
from two minor adjustments in the exchange rates in September and
November 1979,s there have been no other events to mar the operation of
the EMS. This re-evaluation of member currencies was the most radical
shift in the EMS's three-year history.
Some analysists had expected a major adjustment to occur on the
weekend of August 15, 1981, with the big change resting on the French
franc.3 However, realignments have never occurred when the market was
expecting them, and when they have finally happened they have always
been less significant than had been anticipated. The revaluation was basi-
cally the result of widely disparate economic conditions of the EMS mem-
bers. Inflation rates during the period before revaluation, for example,
ranged from 20% in Italy to 15% in France and 6% in Germany.4
Many observers noted that severe pressures were building within the
EMS as a result of divergent French and German economic policies. Ger-
many attempted to restrain monetary expansion to the lower end of its
four to seven percent target range. The Socialist government of Frangois
Mitterand, on the other hand, moved in the opposite direction. Focusing
on reducing unemployment, the French government increased the mini-
mum wage, reduced the work week, and embarked on a program to create
210,000 public sector jobs. It also attempted to bolster the franc with re-
cord high interest rates.
The French franc fell 31% against the dollar from July 1980 to Au-
gust 1981. The French increased interest rates to 22%, and spent about
$12 billion of their reserves to prop up their sagging franc against the
other EMS currencies and the dollar as capital fled the country. 6 In the
week ending September 24, 1981, for example, the French central bank
spent nearly $2 billion to support the franc.' The Germans also inter-
vened with more than $6 billion in foreign exchange market purchases.7
Under the joint float arrangement, each of the currencies in the EMS
2. The finance ministers of the EMS raised the value of the Deutsche mark two percent
against six other EMS currencies and five percent against the Danish krone in the first
realignment of the six-month-old EMS on September 24, 1979. Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1979, at
4, col. 1. The second realignment of the EMS currencies took place on November 30, 1979,
when the Danish government devalued its krone by five percent against the other currencies
of the EMS. BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY (CCH), Nov. 1979, at 30.
3. Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1981, at 80.
4. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981 at 1, col. 1.
5. Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1981, at 80. When the market rate for any currency pair reaches
its predetermined limit, both central banks have a legal obligation to intervene to keep their
currencies within the band. Res. No. 32/1978, Dec. 8, 1978, of the European Council, [ 1978),
3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 10,095.
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
7. Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1981, at 80.
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is given a fixed rate against each other's currency and is allowed to float
2.25% above or below that rate. A few days before the realignment, the
French franc had fallen below its band against the German mark.6 France
did not want to devalue its currency, which would have been a politically
embarrassing event for the new Socialist government. Some Common
Market specialists indicated they welcomed the realignment, but others
were disappointed that the franc was not devalued further.'
The continued credibility of the European Monetary System depends
on the speed and smoothness with which the political decisions to realign
can be taken. The London Times was highly critical of the realignment,
which came after eight hours of intense discussions:
The ministers and their officials met today under a deadline imposed
by world financial markets. Failure to have produced a political deci-
sion in time for the opening of the Tokyo foreign exchange market at
one o'clock Brussels time on Monday morning could have resulted in
a day of chaos on international money markets. 0
Furthermore, Belgium successfully resisted pressures to devalue its
franc-long the weakest EMS currency-on the ground that its interim
government, holding power until elections in November 1981, did not
have the authority to approve such a step.11 But the failure to agree on a
devaluation of the Belgian franc was seen by many as a grave weakness in
the new pattern of exchange rates that would sooner or later result in
speculative currency flows upsetting the system.1" Some analysts predict
that the EMS will come under renewed pressure, possibly within six
months."' Others feel that another realignment in 1982 looks "distinctly
possible.""
Nevertheless, most analysts agree that the EMS has fulfilled its basic
aim of helping to steady exchange rate fluctuations, especially during a
period marked by dollar weaknesses and strengths as well as wide swings
in interest rates.'8 The changes should make French and Italian goods
8. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
9. "That decision was more political than financial," one analyist contended. Wall St.
J., Oct. 6, 1981, at 31, col. 1.
10. London Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
11. Wall St. J., Oct 5, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
12. London Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at 17, col. 6. Indeed, on February 21, 1982, the Belgian
franc was devalued 8.5%, which was its first devaluation since 1949. THE EcoNomIST, Feb.
27, 1982, at 61. The Danish krone was also devalued 3%. Id.
13. Id. at 19, col. 3.
14. THE EcoNoMIST, Oct. 18, 1981, at 70.
15. "The European Monetary System has emerged remarkably well from Ithel realign-
ment of its major currencies .... The EMS has thus survived a potential source of major
disturbance in the foreign exchange markets." London Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at 13, col. 1.
The EMS might be increasing its membership and responsibilities as there has been specu-
lation that the United Kingdom and Greece may join the EMS. Although the United King-
dom decided not to join the EMS as a full member, it forms part of the European Currency
Unit (ECU), has transferred its share of reserves to the European Monetary Fund, and has
pledged to maintain a "stable" exchange rate. THE EcoNomisr, Mar. 17, 1979, at 74. Greece
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cheaper in the six other countries of the EMS as well as in the United
States. By making exports from France and Italy more competitive while
simultaneously decreasing their imports, the realignment could help these
countries reduce large trade deficits and restore international confidence
in their currencies. These changes should also enable France and Italy to
start reducing the high interest rates they were forced to adopt to prevent
the flight of capital to other countries. In addition, inflationary tendencies
in West Germany and the Netherlands should be reduced as a result,
while the French franc should gain in strength. Finally, the realignment
will discourage investment in the U.S. dollar-a very favorable haven due
to high U.S. interest rates-and relieve the criticism levelled at U.S. fiscal
policy. Hopefully, realignment may also lessen the counterattacks
launched by Washington in defense of its policies.
J.H. W.Jr.
Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A.:
Sovereign Immunity And The Constitutional
Right To Jury Trial
Three circuit courts of appeal' recently considered the seventh
amendment right' to jury trial in conjunction with actions brought under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).' Specifically, the
courts addressed whether all actions brought pursuant to the FSIA must
be tried to the court without a jury, and whether the Act is the sole basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction in civil actions against agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns. More importantly, the courts con-
sidered whether, if the answers to both of the above questions are in the
affirmative, the FSIA is consistent with the seventh amendment guaran-
joined the European Community on January 1, 1981, but has not linked its drachma to the
system even though it has signed the basic EMS agreements. Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981, at
26, col. 2.
1. See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), and Ruggerio
v. Compania Pervana De Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981),
wherein the courts affirmed district court orders striking jury demands on grounds consis-
tent with those of Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
2. The seventh amendment states in relevant part: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
." U.S. CoNasT. amend. VII. '
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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